Limitations on Transferring and Reputing
转让和信誉的局限性
Identities have two states that can be changed at the request of the Identity. Trading and Reputing. When the Identity’s state changes it is frozen for 24 hours and can not repute, gain reputation, or trade tokens. Once the 24 hour period is up the Identity can then either trade or repute depending on it’s current state.
身份ID有两种状态可以根据身份的要求而改变，交易和信誉。当身份的状态改变时，它被冻结24小时，不能享受信誉，赢得声誉，或交易tokens。一旦超过24小时冻结期，身份就可以根据其当前状态进行交易或享受信誉。
This makes it so that applications and users can not spend and refill their balances quickly by reputing and transferring tokens between accounts and gaming the system.
这使得应用程序和用户不能通过在账户和游戏系统之间进行信誉和转移tokens来快速地花费和重新填充他们的余额。
No reputation is gained from transferring tokens between Identities, and the maximum 100 token limit still applies meaning you can not transfer 100 tokens from two different Identities to the same Identity or they will overflow and only the first transfer will succeed.
不能通过在ID之间传递tokens获得信誉，并且，最大100 tokens的限制仍然适用，即不能将100个tokens从两个不同的身份转移到同一个身份，否则它们将溢出，并且只有第一个能传输成功。
Sybil Attacks and Reputation Gaming
女巫攻击与信誉博弈
译者注：Sybil Attacks 百度百科解释为“女巫攻击”，是指利用社交网络中的少数节点控制多个虚假身份，从而利用这些身份控制或影响网络的大量正常节点的攻击方式。
By only allowing User Identities to repute once per entity and requiring 1 EOS ( governed price ) for RIDL registration the cost of giving an application a high reputation maliciously is 1 EOS*Reputation wanted.
通过允许用户身份ID仅对每个实体进行一次刷新，并且需要1个EOS（受支配的价格）才能注册RIDL，申请一个高信誉的应用程序需要是1个EOS信誉。
It is harder yet to game a user’s reputation because of the limitation of minimum good standing ( initialized at 100, but governed and set on a sliding scale based on averages ) that an application needs in order to repute users. If a malicious actor wanted to give a User Identity 1000 reputation within a 24 hour period they would need to create 1000 applications and then 100,000 users to repute those applications. The cost of RIDL alone would be 101,000 EOS. For maximum reputation that would require 10,000 applications and 1,000,000 users, equaling 1,010,000 EOS. This does not account for the costs of EOS resource staking. The attacker would also instantly be traceable due to the amount of EOS they are moving from their account into these smaller accounts.
获得一个用户的信誉是很难的，因为最小的良好地位（初始化为100，但被控制并设置在基于平均值的滑动尺度上）的限制是应用程序需要的，以便让用户赞誉。如果一个存心不良的人想要在24小时内给用户身份1000的信誉，那么他们将需要创建1000个应用程序，然后100000个用户对这些应用程序进行解密。RIDL的成本仅为101000欧元。对于需要10000个应用程序和1000000个用户的最大信誉，等于1010000个EOS。这并不能说明EOS资源定位的成本。攻击者也将立即追溯到，由于大量的EOS正在从他们的帐户转移到这些较小的帐户。
Because the RIDL ledger is publicly visible and reputations are displayed any user can flag an Identity if they notice a large amount of fake reputes towards it. After a threshold the Identity will start losing 1 positive reputation for every flag applied. Flags expire after 7 days and can be reapplied.
因为RIDL分类帐是公开可见的，并且信誉能被显示，任何用户都可以标记一个身份，如果他们注意到大量虚假的名声。在一个阈值之后，身份将开始失去1个正面的声誉。标志在7天后到期，可以重新应用。
